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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-2162 
____________ 
 
IN RE: JAMES HARTMAN, 
Debtor 
 
 
JAMES HARTMAN, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK NA, d/b/a America’s Servicing Company; 
US BANK NA, as Trutee for Residential Asset Securities Corporation; 
HOME EQUITY MORTGAGE ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, 
Series 2005-EMX5; ABC CORPS 1-10; LLCS 1-10 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 2-15-cv-07093) 
District Judge:  Honorable Esther Salas  
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2018 
 
Before:  SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 6, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
James Hartman appeals the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court’s dismissal of his complaint against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. d/b/a America’s 
Servicing Company and U.S. Bank, N.A. (together, “Wells Fargo”) for (i) declaratory 
relief barring Wells Fargo’s foreclosure on his real property; and (ii) negligent 
misrepresentation.  We will affirm. 
I. 
In September of 2005, Hartman and his wife (the “Homeowners”) took out a 
$697,000 loan (the “Loan”) secured by their real property in Chatham, New Jersey.  They 
executed the Loan through a promissory note and mortgage (collectively, the “Mortgage 
Documents”).  Years later, they entered into a loan modification agreement with Wells 
Fargo, the Loan’s servicer, that capitalized the Loan’s interest, but did not alter its 
October 1, 2035 maturity date.   
Shortly after, the Homeowners failed to make their monthly payments.  As a 
result, Wells Fargo issued a Notice of Intention to Foreclose on the property, thereby 
declaring default and accelerating the debt’s date of maturity.  When the Homeowners 
did not remedy the default, Wells Fargo filed suit to foreclose on the property.  The 
Homeowners did not file a response to the complaint, but instead jointly filed for Chapter 
13 bankruptcy. 
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Between 2009 and 2011, the Homeowners submitted two additional loan 
modification applications to Wells Fargo.  Wells Fargo denied the first after the parties 
mediated and the Homeowners rejected Wells Fargo’s forbearance agreement.  It denied 
the second without negotiation, citing to then-active investor guidelines that limited 
debtors to only one capitalization during the loan’s lifetime.   
 In October of 2013, the New Jersey Superior Court entered a Foreclosure 
Dismissal Order due to Wells Fargo’s failure to prosecute.  The Chancery Division later 
reinstated the foreclosure action on a six-month conditional basis, ordering that if Wells 
Fargo did not take action by December 12, 2014, its foreclosure case would be closed and 
Wells Fargo would have to commence a new action against the Homeowners.  The six-
month deadline passed without action by Wells Fargo.1  Hartman then filed an individual 
petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and filed an adversary complaint (i) seeking a 
declaratory judgment that Wells Fargo is time-barred from commencing a foreclosure 
action against the property; and (ii) claiming negligent misrepresentation.   
The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Hartman’s complaint, and the District Court, in 
its appellate role, affirmed.   
 II. 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding,2 and the 
                                              
1 After the deadline passed, Wells Fargo moved for an extension of time, but Hartman 
filed his bankruptcy petition before a ruling was issued. 
2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 1334(b). 
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District Court had jurisdiction over the appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s final order.3  
We have appellate jurisdiction to review the final order of the District Court,4 which we 
review de novo.5  
III. 
The District Court correctly concluded that Wells Fargo had twenty years from the 
date of the Homeowners’ default to bring a foreclosure action and that Hartman failed to 
plead a claim for negligent misrepresentation.  
A. 
 The applicable New Jersey statute imposes one of three deadlines for commencing 
a foreclosure action: the earliest of (a) six years from the maturity date set forth in the 
mortgage documents; (b) thirty-six years from the date the mortgage was recorded or 
executed; or (c) twenty years from the date of default.6 
Hartman argues that subsection (a) controls and that the statute of limitations 
began to run on October 5, 2008, when Wells Fargo accelerated the Loan’s maturity date 
by demanding immediate repayment of the entire Loan.  However, the District Court 
found otherwise, imposing subsection (c)’s twenty-year statute of limitations, which 
                                              
3 See id. § 158(a). 
4 See id. §§ 158(d), 1291. 
5 See Schlumberger Res. Mgmt. Servs. v. CellNet Data Sys. (In re CellNet Data Sys.), 327 
F.3d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We exercise plenary review of an order issued by a 
district court sitting as an appellate court in review of the bankruptcy court.”). 
6 N.J.S.A. § 2A:50-56.1. 
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began to run on the date of the Homeowners’ default.  We agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion. 
Statutory interpretation begins with the text.7  Courts are required to “give effect to 
every clause and word of a statute and be reluctant to treat statutory terms as mere 
surplusage.”8   
As the District Court highlighted,9 subsection (a) includes a clause that provides 
that the maturity date set forth in the mortgage documents will apply unless “the date 
fixed for the making of the last payment or the maturity date has been extended by a 
written instrument, [then] the action to foreclose shall not be commenced after six years 
from the extended date under the terms of the written instrument . . . .”10  However, it 
does not reference an exception for accelerated maturity dates, though acceleration 
clauses are standard in mortgage documents11 and addressed elsewhere in New Jersey 
law.12 
                                              
7 Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002). 
8 Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 539 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted). 
9 The District Court relied heavily on the reasoning of a panel of this Court in In re 
Washington, 669 Fed. App’x 87 (3d Cir. 2016), a non-precedential opinion addressing 
this exact question.   
10 N.J.S.A. § 2A:50-56.l(a). 
11 See Cent. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Bridgeton v. Van Glahn, 364 A.2d 558, 
560 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976). 
12 See, e.g., N.J.S.A. § 12A:3-118(a) (“[A]n action to enforce the obligation of a party to 
pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due 
date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the 
accelerated due date.”). 
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Nonetheless, Hartman maintains that subsection (a) applies to accelerated maturity 
dates just as it does extended maturity dates.  He is incorrect; as the Mortgage Documents 
establish, October 1, 2035 is the date of maturity applicable to subsection (a).  Our 
principles of statutory interpretation assume that when the legislature “includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it . . . 
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”13  The 
legislature expressly provided for an adjustment of the statute of limitations where the 
maturity date had been extended, but did not include similar language to address 
accelerated maturity dates, though it could have.  Therefore, it would be improper to now 
read such a provision into the text.   
Because the foreclosure was triggered by the Homeowners’ default, the District 
Court correctly concluded that subsection (c) controls. 
B. 
 Hartman additionally argues that representatives of Wells Fargo committed 
negligent misrepresentation by allowing the Homeowners to pursue applications for loan 
modification between 2009 and 2011, even though Wells Fargo knew that a loan could 
only be capitalized once during its lifetime, which the Loan was in 2008.  However, to 
state such a claim, Hartman must show that Wells Fargo owed the Homeowners a duty of 
                                              
13 Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 452 (citation omitted). 
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care that arose independently of their contractual relationship.14  Hartman fails to make 
any such showing;15 therefore, this claim was properly dismissed. 
IV. 
The District Court properly affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order dismissing 
Hartman’s complaint.  We will therefore affirm.  
                                              
14 See Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 788 A.2d 268, 280 (N.J. 2002). 
15 On appeal, Hartman argues that this Court should impose a balancing test to determine 
whether a lender owes a borrower a duty of care; however, he does not explain how or 
why any of the factors he suggests apply to his relationship with Wells Fargo. 
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